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Abstract 
 Government agencies, non-government organizations and academic institutions that 
focus on nuclear nonproliferation have demonstrated a limited capability to make comprehensive 
assessments of how far along a state is in the proliferation process. This deficiency exists despite 
the need to improve programmatic assessments of states that likely pose a risk of developing 
nuclear weapons. Modeling can help the end-user estimate the probable time required for a given 
state to complete a nuclear weapons program. This is highly attractive feature for policy makers 
who – with more accurate assessments – can make informed decisions. 
For any given state it is possible to use information on that state’s industrial strength, 
educational strength, and previous experiences with nuclear fuel cycle technology to assess that 
state’s capabilities and estimate a timeframe for that state to complete a nuclear weapons 
program. This body of research designates a governing equation for the model, discusses the 
technical attributes that are required for every nuclear weapons program, and discusses the 
process for designating values to each process variable. Beneficial applications for using this 
particular model and its limitations are also demonstrated and discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Nuclear weapons are constructed from the same fundamental elements as a civilian 
nuclear power program. This fact defines a fundamental problem created by “dual-use” 
technologies. But technology in itself is not capable of producing nuclear weapons. There must 
be a collective will amongst the leadership of a state to pursue nuclear weapons. The decision to 
pursue a nuclear weapon program (NWP) is ultimately a political one. Technology can only 
dictate how quickly a state can produce a functioning weapon or construct the capability for 
rapid breakout. A state that is determined to produce nuclear weapons will do so as long as the 
political will is strong enough to overcome the opposing geopolitical and economic 
disadvantages from operating a known program. The decision to prevent another state from 
constructing a NWP is also a political one. Keeping a state from acquiring weapons necessitates 
a change in the political will in that state. This can be achieved by 1) making the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon technology so challenging that the cost is not worth the 
perceived benefit, or 2) altering the political composition at the leadership level. Many foreign 
policy instruments exist to exercise both options, but policymakers trying to determine a proper 
course of action on either of these two methods need as clear and accurate as possible a timetable 
to implement an appropriate policy response. 
It is reasonable then to place particular importance on assessing the technical progress of 
a nuclear weapons program in order support and justify policy response options. But there is 
considerable difficulty in creating an accurate diagnosis of a state’s capabilities. Iran is the most 
recent example, as intelligence agencies and various NGO’s still cannot agree on an estimated 
timeframe to produce a weapon [1]. The purpose of this research is to contribute to the 
demonstrated need for a better analytical method for determining the length of time necessary for 
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a given state to produce nuclear weapons. This can be achieved through an examination of 
technical information related to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC), the level of prior experience with 
nuclear facilities, and state-specific metrics. 
Understanding the engineering and technical challenges to produce weapons and 
modeling those challenges based on a given state’s scientific, technical, and industrial 
capabilities will give policymakers a better estimate of their timetable to seek a solution. Using 
the scientific and engineering knowledge of what is necessary to produce a deliverable nuclear 
weapon, a set of criteria can be established whereby it is possible to accurately estimate the 
necessary amount of time for a state to develop a nuclear weapons program based on technical 
capabilities. 
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Chapter 2: The Model 
2.1 – Scope of the Model 
 
For the purpose of this examination, it is helpful to construct several definite expectations 
and definitions in order to accurately define the scope of this work. In addressing how quickly a 
NWP is constructed, it is best to define the scope of the program. What will be considered here is 
based on a combination of real world considerations while addressing what is the minimum 
amount of effort needed to develop a NWP. For that reason, the remainder of this section is 
dedicated to explaining the specifics of those ideas and expectations. 
The notion of a state having a “latent” proliferation capability to produce a weapon is an 
attractive starting point for this research. States with some academic or commercial nuclear 
facilities are also incrementally more capable of producing a nuclear weapon, as understood by 
the “dual-use” problem of nuclear technology. The breakout scenario, whereby a state produces a 
functioning nuclear weapon in three months or less, also then becomes a valid and interesting 
starting point for discussion. However, the concept of latent proliferation and the breakout can be 
very vague. Having the capability to produce a single weapon on short notice – which may be 
desirable for some states – has only limited usefulness. Many states are designated as having 
latent proliferation capabilities, and this is a subject of considerable study [2, 3]. But this does 
not signify the true ability to produce a robust apparatus for sustained weapon construction. 
While having one nuclear weapon maybe enough in a desperate, defensive scenario or as a last 
minute deterrent, there is limited utility to having only one or two nuclear weapons. Therefore 
this research will define a NWP as having the operational capacity to produce at least one 
deliverable weapon annually, and a latent proliferation capability will only be described as a 
possible identifying benchmark to achieve a full NWP. 
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When looking at the civilian NFC, it is possible to narrow down what is an essential component 
for weapon production. What is principally essential to construct a nuclear weapon is the special 
nuclear material (SNM). The type of SNM sought after, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 
plutonium, will dictate a whole series of decisions based on what is required to manufacture that 
particular type of SNM. In addition to the presence of certain government-controlled NFC 
facilities, this examination will include state-specific information on: the strength of industry, the 
strength of the scientific base, current and previous NFC operations experience, and discuss the 
rate of weapons pursuit. Table 2.1 is a breakdown of NFC processes that are explicitly required 
for the production of a given SNM. 
 
Figure 2-1: Diagram of the nuclear fuel cycle [4] 
 5 
 
Table 2.1: Nuclear fuel cycle processes for a NWP 
Weapon Material Pursued Nuclear Fuel Cycle Step 
Uranium Enrichment 
Plutonium 
Fuel Fabrication 
Irradiation 
Reprocessing 
Both 
Mining 
Milling 
Conversion 
 
2.2 – Exclusions 
In determining what will be the subject of examination, it became apparent that it is 
equally important to address what will not be considered or represented in the technical model. 
Because the focus is placed on analyzing the time to produce a NWP based on technical 
capabilities alone – and because there is simply not enough time to address everything of 
possible consideration – the model will not address issues related to cost, political or economic 
conditions in the state (outside of those industries directly involved) or the inclusion of more 
sophisticated military dimensions in an NWP. 
Costs associated with developing a NWP are understandably high, and they serve as an 
interesting metric for analyzing the intentions of a suspected proliferator. But reasonable 
estimations are incredibly difficult to calculate without knowing the exact nature of the NFC 
infrastructure used or current and historical market prices, labor costs, etc. One must also take 
into consideration the additional costs associated with keeping a NWP clandestine; this can 
substantially increase the cost of a program because of expenses like building hardening, 
additional protection assets or dummy buildings [5, p. 99]. This lack of accuracy makes cost an 
unattractive variable to examine at this time. 
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Different economic or political systems might make it easier or more difficult to allocate 
resources towards a state project like a NWP. But the sheer difficulty of analyzing these 
parameters necessitates the need for an independent study beyond this work. And the possible 
changes in political and economic conditions during the course of a program add further 
difficulty. This being the case, it is possible in some sense to describe such changes through the 
“pursuit rate” (discussed in the next section). Several other possible event parameters like 
external intervention and technical setbacks are unpredictable by their nature, and cannot be 
realistically accounted for in this work. 
The modern NWP includes many military-specific facets that ensure survivability and 
increase effectiveness. Such military dimensions are generally related to the deployment of 
weapons, and these can include: possessing viable delivery vehicles, a command and control 
structure, basing, storage, and a developed doctrine for use. Having these elements in place is 
very important for the realistic deployment and operation of nuclear weapons, but developing 
these elements will take place either in parallel to NWP development or will not directly affect 
the time to construct a rudimentary weapon. The assumption will be made that a successfully 
completed weapon would resemble a yield on the same scale as the “Little Boy” or “Fat Man” 
weapons that were used in World War II and can be deliverable by plane. 
 
2.3 – Governing Equation of the Model 
 Of course it should be noted that this is not the first exploration on the technical features 
of what constitutes a NWP. Work has already been conducted to examine the factors that 
influence proliferation [3, 6]. These works give some categories proliferation indicators, but this 
meant to address whether or not a state should be categorized as having a latent proliferation 
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status. These studies are also great starting points for the time-table model because they discuss 
basic criteria, but there is an over-simplification. Simply having a threshold production-level of 
steel or a few years of experience in research reactor operation may signify having the basic tools 
and some measure of experience to make a NWP. But this is like suggesting that a second-year 
art student with access to paint, brushes, and a blank canvas is only a measure of time away from 
replicating the Mona Lisa; the statement may be true, but it is not terribly helpful. And if you can 
deem a state as being capable of developing nuclear weapons because said state has reached a 
threshold amount of total electrical power production – say 200 MWe installed capacity if using 
Meyer’s model [3, p. 189] – then what can be said about a state with a 1,000 or 10,000 MWe 
installed capacity? Is such a state able to dedicate more energy to a NWP, and thus produce a 
weapon more quickly? 
 This research aims to go a step farther by taking many of these same metrics used in 
previous studies and using them as a staging point. There is undoubtedly an effective “critical 
mass” of industrial production and collective experience necessary to produce a NWP1. And if 
the argument can be made that there is a “threshold” level, then there should be a way to express 
this increased capability. From this idea, Equation (2.1) is proposed as a way of systematically 
combining the information that will be generated over the next few chapters.  
ܶ ൌ ோூ ቈ∑
ௐೕ
ௌೢೕ
௃
௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ௉ೖௌುೖ
௄௞ୀଵ ቉   (2.1) 
 
Because the ultimate question to be determined is the time, T, to complete an NWP, the various 
NFC process steps, P, and weaponization steps, W, will have to be expressed individually. The 
total time is expressed as the aggregate of all the steps. The process steps can be further broken 
                                                 
1 Meyer partially describes this as a quantitative scientific demand [3, p. 32] 
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down into construction, C, and operation, O, steps as show in Equation (2.2). Each of these steps 
is divided by a scientific knowledge factor, Sw and Sp, as appropriate, and the full summation of 
the terms is multiplied by the ratio of a rate factor, R, and an industrial factor, I. Equation (2.3) is 
the expression that will be used as our modeling equation. 
௞ܲ ൌ ܱ௞ ൅ ܥ௞, ݇ ൌ 1, 2, 3, … , ܭ (2.2) 
 
ܶ ൌ ோூ ቈ∑
ௐೕ
ௌೢೕ
௃
௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ሺைೖା஼ೖሻௌುೖ
௄௞ୀଵ ቉ (2.3) 
 
C = Incomplete Nuclear Fuel Cycle Step Construction Time 
T = Estimated time to Full NWP 
I = Industrial Effectiveness Factor 
O = Nuclear Fuel Cycle Step Operation Time 
P = Nuclear Fuel Cycle Process Time 
R = Rate of Pursuit 
SP = Scientific Knowledge Coefficient (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Process) 
SW = Scientific Knowledge Coefficient (Weaponization) 
W = Weaponize-Step Operation Time 
The final value for the time to NWP completion is based on describing each nuclear process step 
as a measure of effort that the state must endure. The level of exertion for each step will depend 
upon the state’s knowledge of the technical attributes for that step. This expression is meant to be 
a simple method for translating qualitative information into quantitative values for evaluation 
purposes. But it is also clear that describing a state’s future NWP efforts as a cumulative effort is 
not completely satisfactory to real-world conditions or expectations. 
Table 2.2: Weapon-Creation (W) & knowledge steps (Sw) for chosen SNM 
Weapon Material Used Activity 
Uranium -- 
Plutonium Heavy Metal Compression Testing 
Both 
Design 
Metallurgy 
Fuzing 
Initiation 
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 Equation (2.3) can be interpreted as a methodology through which all of the process steps 
must proceed in a linear, series fashion. But in actuality the development steps for all large-scale 
industrial processes will be pursued, to some degree, in parallel. An example is that reactors 
cannot operate before the fuel is fabricated for that reactor. This parallel process methodology is 
not captured directly in the proposed model, but it can be indirectly implied – or at least 
compensated for. Developing multiple nuclear process steps at the same time increases the 
arbitrary “threshold” value that industry must be able to support. The state’s ability to mobilize 
machines and manpower is a major limiting factor. Therefore a state with a strong industry is 
more capable of multi-tasking.  
The pursuit rate can also help address the issue presented by this model’s lack of a 
parallel process methodology. The rate of weapons pursuit will represent the variable level of 
effort on the part of the technical community. For example, the dedication of resources and 
manpower to the Manhattan Project was unprecedented compared to other programs as 
compared to programs created more subtly to avoid overt detection by modern international 
nonproliferation regimes. This variable can also be thought of as a level of urgency 
measurement. These levels are described in Table 2.3. The rate of pursuit of weapons is also 
predominantly a political decision, but it has great effect on technical developments. 
Table 2.3: Nuclear weapons program pursuit rates (R) 
Pursuit Rate Description 
Crash Absolute national priority 
Aggressive Accelerated development; less urgent 
Cautious Slower development to avoid detection 
Exploratory Low interest; keeping the option "open" 
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2.4 – Model Calibration 
 The best way to assign values to the program variables is to examine the technical details 
of each NFC process, the details of weaponization activities, and the NWP’s of the non-NPT 
nuclear weapon states – hereby called “de facto nuclear weapon states.” Looking at how long it 
takes to develop a uranium-based NWP means examining recent historical data on the nuclear 
programs of states that developed this technology for weapons purposes; the same is true for 
plutonium-based weapons. The programs that will be examined include those of Israel, Pakistan, 
India, South Africa and North Korea. These are listed in Table 2.4 along with the understood 
dates of programmatic development and the type of SNM initially pursued. Because each step is 
broken down into the fuel cycle processes and weapon-assembly steps, each step will be 
examined through the lenses of each of these five programs. From the compiled data, the values 
of each variable and coefficient can reasonably be determined. The limitation on publically 
accessible data for each of these nuclear programs will play a factor in the analysis described 
further in this research. There is also a clear problem of separating out external assistance, but 
the combined information from all of these programs should establish a basic dataset to draw 
conclusions from. 
Table 2.4: De facto nuclear weapons states 
State Weapon Type Decision-to-Weapon Datesa 
Israel Plutonium 1955 – 1967 
India Plutonium 1964 – 1974b 
North Korea Plutonium 1982c – 2006 
Pakistan Uranium 1972 – 1990 
South Africa Uranium 1974 – 1978 
aSource: NTI country profiles [7], bIndia’s program is considered complete with their first 
(peaceful) nuclear test, cAs coded by Jo & Gartzke’s data notes [8].
 
 While the ultimate goal of this research is to develop an equation that can be applied to 
any state, the ability to test the validity of this concept hinges upon an accurate assessment of 
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several test states. To help facilitate discussion throughout this report, it is important to identify 
the three states that will be used in the analysis. These states include South Korea, Turkey, and 
Myanmar. A brief assessment of these states’ technical programs is available in Table 2.5. Each 
state was chosen for the analysis either because they are fairly relevant in recent discussions of 
nonproliferation or the state represents a major regional actor. These three states also represent 
an excellent cross-section of different levels of nuclear development. 
Table 2.5: States for model analysis 
State Initial Technical Assessment 
Myanmar Startup 
South Korea Advanced Program 
Turkey Knowledgable 
 
Before state-specific data is examined, a technical discussion of each of the NFC processes and 
weaponization steps is necessary. This information is presented in order to help facilitate 
discussion and rationalize the values assigned to these steps, as detailed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Steps 
 The first step is to examine the technical issues involved with each NFC process. Each of 
the steps discussed in this section corresponds to a specific variable within the overall governing 
equation – which will be designated in Chapter 5. While it is important to provide a 
comprehensive, detailed look at each process step to determine what difficulties a state 
encounters, it is beyond the scope of this unclassified research to take on the form of a generic 
NWP feasibility study. 
 
3.1 – Mining & Processing 
 The most critical step in making a nuclear weapon is creating the SNM, and this is a 
process that starts from the ground up. Uranium ore supplies are the major starting point. From a 
technical standpoint, uranium mining is probably the easiest step to complete. Having domestic 
uranium supplies is important for sustained weapons development, but not having access to a 
natural uranium deposit may not necessarily complicate NWP development if access to uranium 
can be obtained by other means (commercial or illicit trade). Purchasing a base product on the 
market will bypass this step in weapon acquisition, but a lack of domestic supplies will severely 
inhibit future growth of a nuclear stockpile after initial capability is achieved. For the purpose of 
this research, domestic production will be factored into the model. 
 
3.1.1 – Construction 
Domestic uranium resource development starts with exploration of known or estimated 
uranium deposits. Most states will have an understanding of their geography from constant 
exploration of other resources and commodities. Detailed studies on modern exploration 
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programs help create more cost-effective mining operations [9]. This analysis will use the more 
general approach used by the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in classifying 
uranium resources. 
The distinction between conventional and unconventional resources is drawn based on 
whether or not the uranium is the primary commodity or a very minor by-product of a given 
mining operation, respectively [10, p. 261]. Uranium resources are also generally divided into 
categories based on the certainty of the uranium content in a particular location. What are judged 
as “reasonably assured resources” (RAR) are deposits with very detailed knowledge and a high 
confidence in the presence of uranium. RAR are determined to be the easiest resources to exploit 
with current technology [10, p. 261]. Expressions exist for describing the decreasing certainty of 
given uranium deposits. These are described by two separate categories of Estimated Additional 
Resources (EAR-I and EAR-II) and Speculative Resources (SR) [10, p. 261]. The level of initial 
work to be carried out in mine construction is dependent on the categorization of proposed sites, 
as additional exploration will be needed for less known/attractive deposits. 
Mining is generally divided into open pit or underground operations, and further specifics 
are dictated by the geological features of the deposit site. Neither of these two methods is 
technically challenging. Experience is likely to be less important in setting up mining operations, 
but will contribute to efficiency. Data on the current status of known uranium deposits and 
mining activities are compiled by the IAEA for public access through several sources, which will 
be highlighted later. 
Once the ore is removed from the ground, it must be processed and separated. Operations 
are established for this removal and depend on the form of the extracted ore and the anticipated 
production capacity. Constructing processing operations for the first time will likely require the 
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setup of pilot-scale operations to gain practical operating experience. Flow sheets and equipment 
lists have to be made. Equipment includes items needed for crushing, grinding, leaching, solid-
liquid separation, uranium recovery, and precipitation and drying [11, p.29]. IAEA TECDOC-
314 is an excellent reference for what is necessary to establish a pilot uranium processing plant. 
Another option to traditional mining and processing is in situ leaching (ISL). This process allows 
the operator to dissolve and mobilize the uranium in the ground, and pump it to the surface 
where it is then further processed [10, p. 266]. ISL is limited in its application to deposits in 
sandstone, but can be a more cost-effective alternative to traditional mining techniques [12, p.7]. 
If the proper situation arises, ISL will be considered in lieu of other mining methods. ISL also 
eliminates several steps in the milling process. 
The OECD reports on uranium mining reinforce the notion that this technology is widely 
understood. Figure 3.1 is a chart from the OECD that shows that uranium mining development 
has progressed more slowly in the time period from discovery to the start of operations. 
Economic, environmental, and regulatory factors are the primary reasons for this trend in 
commercial uranium development [13, 145]. But considering the ulterior motive for uranium 
mining, operations can be expected to start at a much earlier time. This work will estimate a 
period of five years from discovery to development under nominal conditions at the “cautious” 
rate. 
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Figure 3.1: Elapsed time between discovery and start of mining for all methods [13] 
 
3.1.2 – Operation 
Extracting and processing uranium ore is dependent on the form of the ore and the grade 
of the uranium. Mining operations are the excavation of the ore, transport to the processing plant, 
and removal of waste rock. Supporting operations for uranium mining are not terribly different 
than any other mining operation; radiation monitoring from airborne particles is the only unique 
safety consideration [9, p. 139].  
Many processing operations are very similar. Technology for precipitation is dependent 
on the choice of the reagent used, and purification is almost always through ion exchange or 
solvent extraction [9, p. 140]. Several generic process flow sheets are shown in Figure 3.2, and 
Figure 3.3 is an example of a more specific flow sheet; both figures are adopted from the IAEA. 
The finished product in mining and milling is U3O8, known by the name yellowcake, which is a 
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widely traded commodity among civilian utilities. Detailed equipment lists can be found in 
IAEA TECDOC-314. Labor requirements will include work by mining specialists (heavy 
machinery, explosives experience), logistics, chemists, metallurgists, and construction workers. 
The work at this stage has unique challenges, but they are not as technically challenging 
compared to other NFC processes.  
In terms of the amount of uranium needed on an annual basis to sustain a NWP as 
previously defined, there are several determining factors: the type of SNM sought after, the grade 
of the ore in deposits, and the level of the technology. Plutonium-based weapons produced in a 
graphite-moderated reactor that use natural uranium will have different demands than a state 
pursuing uranium-based weapons. And for uranium-based weapons, the choice and operational 
parameters of the enrichment technology will dictate mining demands.  
 
Figure 3.2: Process options for treating various types of ores [14] 
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Figure 3.3: Sample diagram of a uranium ore processing plant [11, p. 14] 
 
3.2 – Conversion 
 Chemical conversion is a critical step regardless of the SNM sought after. Once the 
uranium yellowcake is produced, it must go through chemical processes to change into a form 
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that is more suitable for either enrichment or natural uranium fuel fabrication. In the case of 
enrichment for uranium-based weapons, this process involves conversion from U3O8 to UF6 gas 
and subsequent storage in canisters. Commercial scale U3O8 to UF6 conversion facilities are 
operated in Canada, China, the UK, France, Russia, and the USA [15, p. 6]. If producing natural 
uranium fuels – which are ideal for plutonium production to maintain high concentrations of U-
238 – then the conversion from yellowcake to UO2 or uranium metal is carried out. In either 
case, conversion is a predominantly chemical process that can be carried out at virtually any 
scale. 
 
3.2.1 – Construction 
 The scale of the conversion process will determine the size and scope of facility 
construction. But the requirements for any radiochemical facility are still demanding to increase 
cost-effectiveness, minimize process losses, and possibly to reduce the overall environmental 
footprint to avoid detection. Construction will not have to take into account major shielding 
requirements, as is necessary for reprocessing operations. Demand will be placed on construction 
workers and trade specialists as well as chemical, electrical, industrial, and mechanical 
engineers. 
 
3.2.2 – Operation 
 The yellowcake uranium is first purified and reduced to UO2 or UO3, depending on the 
process. Purification can take place at the milling stage, but for our purposes we will consider 
Figure 3.4 as the initial conversion steps. Further conversions to UF6 for uranium enrichment 
processes are carried out via fluorination and hydrofluorination processes, as shown in Figure 
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3.5. At this point, the UF6 gas is liquefied and shipped in canisters to the enrichment facilities. 
Reversing this process after the enrichment step is necessary for uranium weapons to convert 
enriched UF6 gas to uranium metal, but this process will have a smaller throughput demand. A 
regular group of process engineers, chemists and operators will be engaged in the day to day 
operations in the conversion step. 
 
Figure 3.4: UO2 and UO3 purifying and reduction [16]2 
                                                 
2 Please note Figure 3.3 illustrates three different iterations: thermal denitration (TDN), ammonium diuranate 
(ADU), and ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC). 
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Figure 3.5: Flow sheets of conversion to UF6 [16] 
 
3.3 – Enrichment 
 This is by far the most critical and labor intensive step for uranium-based weapons 
development. The ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels (80% U-235 or higher) is 
absolutely necessary for modern military applications. Enriching to weapons grade is relatively 
trivial once the capability is established to enrich fuels to levels needed for light water reactors 
(LWR) – typically 3-5% U-235.  Commercial-scale enrichment facilities have enough production 
capacity to fuel many reactors or – through simple changes in the process stream – can support 
creating enough HEU for several weapons annually. 
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 Several different methods for uranium enrichment are based on technologies that are 
decades old and are fairly common. These technologies – while all designed to separate the U-
235 isotope from U-238 – are different from one another in size and scope, and this makes a one-
size-fits-all approach difficult for this study. A good example of this problem is highlighted in 
studies of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear program to enrich uranium using multiple technologies 
[17, p. 317]. But to simplify the overall determination of capabilities, this examination will focus 
only on gaseous centrifuge technology. 
 The centrifuge is seen as the best current method for enrichment because of its relatively 
low energy consumption – compared to gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic isotope separation 
– and its ease of concealment. It is estimated that centrifuges use only 4% of the electrical power 
that is used in a diffusion plant of the same capacity [18]. Table 3.1 is a set of additional 
qualitative ratings to explain why centrifuges will be the main focus of this discussion; it should 
be noted that molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) is still not perfected as a technology. 
While there are many different centrifuge designs, they all operate under the same principals and 
have the same generic parts and technical obstacles to overcome. 
 For the stated objective of limiting the NWP scope to the minimum production capacity 
of one weapon per year, the necessary amount of separative work – expressed as separative work 
units (SWU) – will be set as 3,000 SWU/year if natural uranium is used as feedstock and a 0.3% 
tails assay. This amount of separative work will produce 15 kg of weapons-grade uranium, which 
– in addition to the information provided in Table 3.2 – should be enough for a state with low 
technical capability to produce a strong yield. Details on how 3,000 SWU/year was determined 
as the goal are stated below. For simplicity it is a straightforward estimate to understand that a 
cascade hall with very basic centrifuge (1 SWU/year) work output will require 3,000 centrifuges. 
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States that can field centrifuges with better performance characteristics will require fewer 
installed centrifuges to meet the same annual output. 
Table 3.1: Important enrichment technique property ratings according to their contribution to 
proliferation sensitivity 
Size of 
Ease 
of Reflux chemistry 
Separation Equilibrium dedicated batch and criticality 
  factor time and inventory facility recycle problems 
Gaseous 3 3 3 3 1 
diffusion 
Centrifuge 2 1 1 1 1 
Aerodynamic 
      Nozzle 3 1 2 2 1 
      Helikon 3 1 2 1 1 
Chemical 
      Solvent 3 3 3 3 2 
      extraction 
      Ion 3 3 3 3 2 
      exchange 
Laser 
      Molecular 1 1 1 1 1 
      (MLIS) 
      Atomic 1 1 2 3 3 
      (AVLIS) 
Electromagnetic 
      Calutron 1 1 3 2 3 
      Ion 1 1 2 2 3 
      cyclotron 
      resonance           
aRating 1 implies that the factor presents a low barrier to misuse of the technique; rating 3 a significant obstacle to 
misuse; and a rating 2 somewhere in between, bReproduced from Krass et al [19]. 
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Figure 3.6: Interior of a Uranium Gas Centrifuge [20] 
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Table 3.2: Approximate fissile material requirements for pure fission nuclear weapons 
  Technical Capability   Technical Capability   
  Low Medium High Yield (kilotons) Low Medium High   
Weapon- 3 1.5 1 1 8 4 2.5 Highly 
Grade 4 2.5 1.5 5 11 6 3.5 Enriched 
Plutonium 5 3 2 10 13 7 4.0 Uranium 
(kilograms) 6 3.5 3 20 16 9 5.0 (kilograms) 
Table reproduced from Norris, Kristensen & Handler [21]. 
 
3.3.1 – Construction 
 Three primary considerations have to be made with respect to developing uranium 
centrifuge cascades: the design of the centrifuge, the manufacturing of the centrifuges, and the 
construction of the cascade hall. While information on the basic form of the centrifuge is widely 
available, specific designs are rare and most are typically classified. Also the materials needed 
for independent centrifuge development will necessarily depend on the chosen design (either 
indigenously developed designs or clandestinely procured). The centrifuge design for a state with 
little or no experience will be fairly basic, but even this can be overcome by the number of 
deployed centrifuges. Regardless of the design, the same basic parts must be gathered including: 
rotors, metallic casings, magnets, vacuum equipment (pumps, gauges, gaskets and seals), motor 
equipment, bearings, composite tubes, and bases. 
Drawing from observations of Figure 3.6, it is clear that precision machining is an 
absolute requirement when manufacturing the centrifuges. The margin for error in the 
construction of fine parts like the rotor or damping assembly is incredibly small, and poor 
engineering or installation can cause the centrifuge to crash with significant consequences. The 
energy released from a crashed centrifuge can be on the order of a mega-joule, and it must be 
effectively dissipated so that it does not cause failures with other machines nearby [22, p. 32]. 
Iran’s difficulty with its centrifuges provides ample evidence of the technical challenges 
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associated with proper construction techniques [23]. But because the operational capabilities are 
so dependent on the design of the centrifuge, it becomes difficult to gauge the true capacity of a 
state to reach the stated minimum threshold value of 3,000 SWU/year. This is because the 
separation factor of each rotor is determined by the speed that it operates, and the maximum 
speed that the rotor can operate at is determined by the material used to construct the rotor. Table 
3.3 shows how a given rotor material will coincide with a specific separation factor at a given 
speed. The separation factor is a method of describing the amount of separative work conducted 
by a single separation stage. 
Table 3.3: Maximum rotor speeds for given rotor material and the total separation 
factors for given rotor operating speeds 
Material Approximate maximum  
Rotor 
speed Total separation 
  peripheral speed (m/s)  (m/s) factor 
Aluminium alloy 425  300 1.056 
Titanium 440  400 1.1 
High-strength steel 455  500 1.16 
Maraging steel 525  600 1.24 
Glass fibre/resin 600  700 1.34 
Carbon fibre/resin 700  800 1.46 
Data taken from Whitley [22]. 
 
 Once the design of the centrifuges is chosen and a basic laboratory demonstration setup is 
tested for design flaws and performance, the next step is to link the centrifuges in a cascade. The 
cascade hall itself can be any sufficiently large industrial building with radiological support and 
ample power loading. Cascade connections are shown in Figure 3.7 and the “ideal” cascade, the 
best layout for efficient enrichment, is diagramed in Figure 3.8. Multiple cascades can be 
produced for a given enrichment facility, and each cascade can be operated in a modular fashion. 
The exact layout of a cascade is based on six features [24, p. 478]: 
1. feed rate per centrifuge 
2. separative capacity per centrifuge 
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3. desired cascade product assay, Xp 
4. cascade feed assay, Xf 
5. desired cascade tails assay, Xt 
6. number of centrifuges per cascade 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Centrifuge cascade diagram [19] 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Cutaway of the ideal cascade [22] 
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3.3.2 – Operation 
 Operating a centrifuge cascade is not as simple as making sure that everything is 
connected correctly or that there is a steady stream of UF6 gas entering the cascade. Significant 
effort has to be made to maintain the integrity of the system. An important design consideration 
is that ten percent of the centrifuges in a given cascade will crash in a ten year period [22, p. 32]. 
As discussed earlier, crashes are considerable operational problems, and will put the cascade out 
of operation until the unit can be replaced. So there needs to be continued manufacturing of 
replacement centrifuges, parts, and training of available technicians just to maintain regular plant 
operations. 
ܸሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ2ܰ െ 1ሻ݈݊ሾܰ/ሺ1 െ ܰሻሿ    (3.1) 
ܹܷܵ ൌ ݌ܸሺݔ௣ሻ ൅ ݐܸሺݔ௧ሻ െ ݂ܸሺݔ௙ሻ    (3.2) 
 The operational output of a given facility, as dictated by the six aforementioned features, 
is the largest point of interest for this study. Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are the “value” equation 
and equation for calculating SWU [19, pp. 97-99]. In (3.2), x is the fraction of the total uranium 
content that is U-235. The feed assay (xf), product assay (xp), and tails assay (xt) dictate the 
necessary number of SWU necessary for the specific mass inputs/outputs for the feed (f), product 
(p), and tails (t). Tables 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the effects of different input values.  
 As discussed above, the materials used in the centrifuge greatly affect the number of 
centrifuges needed to produce a given amount of separative work. But an important operational 
consideration is how a state might go from a natural uranium feed to a weapons-grade product. 
This final operational consideration can be explored in multiple ways: batch recycling, cascade 
interconnection, or final enrichment through a clandestine facility. Batch recycling is when the 
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cascade that was used for the initial uranium enrichment is pumped down and reused; the 
enriched product from the first run becomes the feed in the second run.  
Table 3.4: Common examples of enriched uranium output   
Amount of 
separative work 
(SWU) 
Product   Feed     
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage 
Tails 
assay 
(kg) enrichment  (kg) enrichment (%) 
200 1 93 226 0.711 0.3 
160 1 93 440 0.711 0.5 
50 1 93 20 5.0 0.5 
40 1 93 23 5.0 1.0 
5000 25 93 5050 0.711 0.3 
3.9 1 3.25 7.2 0.711 0.3 
7.2 1 5.0  11.5 0.711 0.3 
Reproduced from Albright, Berkhout & Walker [17]
 
But besides the obvious safeguards alarms that will be sounded if the residual presence of HEU 
is detected, the batch recycling requires a significant amount of time to stop, pump down, and 
restart the process. Krass et al describe the limitations of batch recycling best by saying: 
Batch recycling wastes large amounts of 235U because the tails assays increase in 
every recycling after the first one. So, much more feed material and operating 
time are needed to produce a kilogram of highly enriched product than in a 
properly designed cascade. Whether such a waste of time and valuable resources 
is considered worthwhile depends, of course, on the strength of the motivation to 
produce highly enriched uranium [19, p. 110]. 
 
This last sentence is very true, but quantifying the strength of the state motivation – 
specific to this particular process step – is a great challenge. Ultimately, it may likely depend on 
whether or not the initial enrichment cascades are known to the international community, and are 
under IAEA safeguards. In either case the second option is more likely, where the product from 
the initial cascade will be enriched to roughly 5% and introduced into a secondary cascade to 
rapidly increase the enrichment level. This method is cascade interconnection – presumably 
described by Krass et al as the aforementioned, “properly designed cascade.” Figure 3.9 and 
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Table 3.6 – both from Glasser – illustrate the nature and effectiveness of the interconnection 
system, respectively. Figure 3.9 is particularly interesting because it is a reported cascade 
configuration proposal adopted by Libya before they elected to abandon their nuclear program. 
The interconnection method may also be likened to current efforts being undertaken by Iran at 
enrichment facilities in Natanz and Qom. 
Table 3.5: Weapon-grade uranium production (93% enriched) 
Capacity Uranium feed Uranium tails WGU No. of days to 
(SWU/y) (% 235U) (% 235U) (kg/y) produce 25 kg 
5000 0.71 0.2 21 435
 0.71 0.3 24 380
 0.71 0.5 31 295
5000 5.0 1.0 122 75
 5.0 2.0 156 60
 5.0 4.0 208 45
15000 0.71 0.2 63 145
 0.71 0.3 72 125
 5.0 1.0 366 25
70000 0.71 0.2 294 31
  5.0 1.0 17000 5
Reproduced from Albright, Berkhout & Walker [17] 
 
Table 3.6: Summary of the breakout scenario starting from natural uranium; 
separative capacity of 15,000 SWU/year 
  Batch Recycling Interconnect 
Production rate 38-40 kg per year 91.0 kg per year 
  (normalized) (with 6000 machines) (with 6000 machines) 
Production rate 35-37 kg per year 88.5 kg per year 
  (real) (with 5576 machines) (with 5832 machines) 
SWU requirements 387 SWU per kg HEU 165 SWU per kg HEU 
Feed-to-product ratio 33,150 kg per kg 280 kg per kg 
Reproduced from Glaser [25] 
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of the cascade as proposed for a Libyan enrichment project [25] 
 
3.4 – Fuel Fabrication 
 Fuel fabrication is only necessary, in this discussion, for producing plutonium. While 
having fuel fabrication capabilities is an important step in the legitimate production of fuel for 
nuclear reactors, it is not a completely necessary step in the fuel cycle for producing uranium-
based weapons. The fuel type likely to be used is either natural uranium for heavy water reactors 
or natural uranium with magnesium cladding – commonly known as Magnox fuel – for use in an 
air-cooled, graphite moderated production reactor (Chapter 3.5 provides an explanation choosing 
a particular reactor design). Magnox fuel is most commonly used by the British nuclear power 
program. There are some significant material challenges in fabricating Magnox elements, and 
manufacturing the cladding for Magnox is more complex than other cladding types [26, p. 197].  
There is likely sufficient information in open literature and conventional metallurgical 
experience to assume that magnesium-aluminum alloys can be readily manufactured.  
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3.4.1 – Construction 
Precision machining and quality control will again be necessary in order to construct the 
fuel elements. Fabricating the fuel elements will mean the construction and operation of a 
modest metallurgical facility with radiological support. The natural uranium used in the fuel will 
be in metal form, which necessitates the adoption of design features to minimize the risk of 
allowing the uranium to oxidize. Uranium metal is very reactive, and is highly susceptible to 
attack by air and water at room temperature. Finely divided uranium can ignite spontaneously at 
room temperature [27, p. 233]. It is likely then that the final chemical conversion step from UF4 
to uranium metal will be carried out at the fuel fabrication site to minimize the potential risks 
from uranium reactivity. 
Creating the cladding forms is also an essential step before the final product can be 
assembled. It is possible to manufacture the fuel cladding at a separate location from the final 
fuel assembly point, but this may place constraints on the output rate. Taking all of the various 
factors into account, the fuel fabrication facility will have to be of sufficient size and scope to 
handle minor chemical conversions, melting and recasting, machining, and welding – all under a 
strict quality control setting. 
 
3.4.2 – Operation 
 The fabrication facility scale will have to be in line with the requirements of the reactor. 
Based on the reactor specifications discussed in the next section, an annual fuel production 
throughput of about 1,500 fuel elements per year is required for the 1,418 process channels in the 
core design [28, p. 25]. Having 1,500 elements is a good round number that will compensate for 
possible unexpected work stoppages or defective products. The fuel assembly operational steps 
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are shown in Figure 3.10. The UF4 gas is reduced by magnesium to form uranium billets, which 
are then vacuum induction melted and alloyed with small amounts of aluminum and iron. 
 
Figure 3.10: Metal uranium fuel fabrication steps [16] 
 
For cladding, the primarily used magnesium alloy is Magnox Al 80, which contains 0.8 
wt. % aluminum and 0.005 wt. % beryllium [29, p. 28]. Strong consideration is given to grain 
size when manufacturing this cladding, requiring the work of materials specialists. Assembling 
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the Magnox fuel elements is fairly straightforward. One end is sealed and welded shut, the 
uranium is inserted along with helium fill-gas, and the other end is sealed [26, p. 201]. Several 
other steps are taken for cleaning and decontaminating. 
The greatest operational consideration is from a quality control standpoint. Defective fuel 
elements will leak when subjected to the conditions in a reactor, and this causes the release of 
fission gases. These gases will not only increase the radiation dose among the reactor operators, 
but it will increase the probability that the reactor will be detected by off-gas signatures. A 
uranium-metal fire may attract unwanted attention. So the quality of the facility operations is 
paramount to operational secrecy of the entire program; cutting corners is not an option in fuel 
fabrication. 
 
3.5 – Irradiation 
 In starting the discussion about plutonium production, it is necessary to list two very 
important facts: plutonium is produced in some quantity in every reactor and almost all 
plutonium compositions can be used in the construction of a rudimentary nuclear weapon. On the 
surface, this means that the ability to assess a state’s capacity to produce plutonium for weapons 
is incredibly complicated. But not all reactors are optimal for producing plutonium that can be 
used in a weapon, and so not every reactor should be treated with suspicion. 
 Before characterizing why research and power production reactors are important in 
generating experience – but not directly considered as a threshold-level process – it is necessary 
to discuss the basic understanding that not all plutonium is created equal. A first attempt at 
constructing a plutonium-based weapon will likely involve a relatively simple, low-tech design; 
any plutonium that does not have the highest possible concentrations of Pu-239 will make an 
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initial weaponization effort much more challenging. Table 3.7 is a representation of some 
common isotopic breakdowns of different grades of plutonium, and Table 3.8 shows some 
characteristics of these isotopes. Super-grade or weapons-grade plutonium (>93% Pu-239) is 
favored for production of basic nuclear weapons because of the reduced critical mass, 
spontaneous neutron generation, and decay heat. 
Table 3.7: Isotopic composition of various grades of plutonium 
  Isotopes 
Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Super-grade 98.0% 2.0%
Weapons-grade 0.012% 93.8% 5.8% 0.35% 0.022% 
Reactor-grade 1.3% 60.3% 24.3% 9.1% 5.0% 
MOX-grade 1.9% 40.4% 32.1% 17.8% 7.8% 
Reproduced from Herring & MacDonald [30] 
 
Civilian power reactors will produce copious amounts of lower quality reactor-grade 
plutonium, while research reactors can produce higher quality plutonium but in much smaller 
quantities. With modern safeguards, neither of these two systems is ideal for producing weapons-
grade plutonium at a rate that is sufficient for the needs of a NWP. There are many plausible 
scenarios whereby plutonium can be diverted and extracted from civilian power plants or 
research reactors3. For simplicity, the assumption is made that known civilian commercial and 
research reactors that are under safeguards will not be used for military plutonium production4 5. 
This study assumes a separate, clandestine effort must be undertaken to produce a reactor small 
enough to stay undetected yet large enough to produce the requisite amount of plutonium needed 
for our arbitrary weapon-per-year benchmark. Based on values described in Table 3.8 and the 
                                                 
3 These types of diversion scenarios are more tend to be oriented towards examining “breakout.” 
4 Tomanin et al give a detailed discussion on Pu-breeding feasibility in research reactors [31]. 
5 Dr. Tunc Aldemir of Ohio State University suggests that higher enrichments and frequent refueling in research 
reactors will prevent their use as a means of plutonium production while avoiding detection [32]. 
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SNM material needs described in Table 3.2, it is decided that producing 10 kg/year will be 
sufficient. 
Table 3.8: Properties of dominant plutonium and americium isotopes 
Spontaneous 
Fission Decay 
  Halflife Bare Crit Neutrons Heat 
Isotope years kg, α-phase neutrons/gm-s Watts/kg 
Pu-238 87.7 10 2600 560 
Pu-239 24,100 10 0.022 1.9 
Pu-240 6,560 40 910 6.8 
Pu-241 14.4 10 0.049 4.2 
Pu-242 3.76E+05 100 1700 0.1 
Am-241 430 100 1.2 114 
Reproduced from Herring & MacDonald [30] 
 
3.5.1 – Construction 
 Because this is an estimate of technical sophistication, the reactor design chosen for this 
study will be a gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactor. Larger and more advanced reactor 
designs can be used by state programs that desire to have an annual plutonium production greater 
than the 10 kg/year benchmark, but this begins to risk exposure of detection. Studies produced 
for the now defunct U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency give an excellent comparison 
of the advantages and disadvantages of different production reactor types. A summary of the 
different reactor concepts from this study are found in Table 3.9. 
The low and medium power reactor options using air and CO2 as a coolant, respectively, 
are exactly the reactor designs needed for this examination. A 20-25 MWth variation of the gas-
cooled reactor design is what was allegedly created by the Syrians – and allegedly destroyed by 
the Israelis in September 2007 [33, p. 2]. For simplicity, the air-cooled design will be the basis of 
this section’s discussion. Construction of a graphite reactor is fairly straightforward compared to 
a modern LWR, but it is still a time consuming process that requires precision engineering and 
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good quality control measures. The choice of cladding used in fuel fabrication, discussed in the 
previous section, will influence the pitch of the fuel elements in the core, but the channel and 
diameters and will be consistent. 
Table 3.9: Representative reactor concepts 
Thermal power (MW) 30 250 400 
Coolant Air CO2 H2O 
Number of fuel channels 1418 1892 2155 
Moderator and reflector Graphite Graphite Graphite 
Total graphite (mt) 989 1550 2260 
Fuel type Nat. U-metal Nat. U-metal Nat. U-metal 
Cladding Mg or Al Mg Al 
Base plants, previously constructed Brookhaven, Calder Hall, Hanford, 
   & operated Marcoule G1 Marcoule G2 Soviet production 
Appox. Pu production rate 10 80 135 
    (kg/full-power year)1 
Uranium requirement 94 147 274 
    (mt/full-power year)1,2 
Fuel burnup 115 620 520 
    (MWd/mtU)1 
Fissile Pu content (%)1 99.2 95.5 96.2 
1Assuming annual fuel cycle, 2Also equal to the total loading and to the quantity of U to be reporcessed in 
recovery of the Pu. Reproduced from Turner et al [28] 
 
Heavy-water moderated production reactors are also likely reactor designs for a NWP. One 
added benefit of using heavy water reactors is the creation of some amount of tritium from 
neutron capture in the coolant. Tritium can then be used as part of a two-stage or boosted fission 
weapon design. Heavy-water reactors can also be designed and operated with on-line refueling – 
increasing the rate of plutonium production. But heavy water reactors require separate heavy 
water production facilities (discussed in Chapter 3.7) and this step requires some additional 
effort. For the sake of providing a somewhat simpler methodology for determining a timeframe, 
the graphite moderated reactor concept was adopted as the primary consideration.  
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Figure 3.11: Cross-section of air-cooled cell [28] 
 
The graphite used for the reactor will have to be manufactured to very high purities, which is not 
technically challenging. And any impurities from neutron-absorbing materials in the graphite 
will be reduced over time while the core is critical. The graphite must be manufactured to a 
higher quality “nuclear grade” which is a simple, but labor intensive process involving the 
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constant heating and manipulation of petroleum-based products [28, p. 103]. Figure 3.12 
demonstrates the steps of this process. 
 
Figure 3.12: Graphite manufacturing process [28] 
 
 Constructing the reactor is by far the most labor intensive step requiring copious amounts 
of concrete for the foundation and walls, a spent-fuel pool, a steel vessel for housing the core, 
assembly of the graphite pile with fuel and control rods, instrumentation and control systems, 
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and ventilation. Safety and security systems are also a necessity, and these systems will include 
shielding, property protection and surveillance assets, and fire suppression equipment. Like any 
industrial operation, connections to necessary utilities (water, electricity, etc.) are needed at the 
level commensurate with demand. Assembling a reactor, even one of rudimentary design is a 
project that takes years to accomplish, and it is reasonable to assume that doing so under a 
clandestine effort is even more time consuming. The number of people dedicated to reactor 
construction would be sizeable, ranging from tradesmen of all varieties to mechanical, electrical, 
and nuclear engineers. 
 
3.5.2 – Operation 
 Regular operations have a similar demand on engineering specialists, but a reduced 
number of trade specialists have to be retained for operations. There are significant costs with 
electricity for systems operation, personnel radiation protection, and security. The operation of 
the reactor itself is not a technical challenge with competent individuals operating the control 
systems. Testing of the reactor and its components would be necessary for several months prior 
to the first fuel loading. Fuel loading/unloading is performed offline with this particular design 
(to assume the most rudimentary case), and the technical competency of operations personnel 
will factor into the speed of changing out the fuel in the core. From Table 3.8 it is clear that the 
target burnup of 115 MWd/mtU will yield slightly larger than one significant quantity of super-
grade plutonium per year. Operating a reactor in this way will only require one scheduled outage 
for fuel reloading per year. At this point, the spent fuel in the core is loaded into a spent fuel pool 
for cooling before going on to reprocessing. 
 40 
 
 Another consideration for avoiding detection when using plutonium production reactors 
is the need to reduce the reactor’s thermal signature. Detection of the facility by heat is a real 
operational factor requiring thermal reduction through heat-exchanges. This will require access 
to a nearby water source and pumping equipment. Heat removal to reduce the reactor’s signature 
may not necessarily be required if the state determines that the risk of discovery is acceptable.6 
 
3.6 – Reprocessing 
 From a proliferation standpoint, developing the facilities to reprocess spent nuclear fuel 
for extracting plutonium is a big red flag. Plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) is a process 
that can be done with very small amounts – on the order of grams – of irradiated uranium targets 
in a radiochemical laboratory setting. But even though reprocessing is simply a chemical 
separation, the nature of the fission products and transuranics in spent fuel places substantial 
engineering demands on this process. Constructing and supporting regular PUREX efforts for 
even a small annual throughput requires a significant initial and sustained resource investment. 
 The PUREX process starts by receiving spent nuclear fuel – presumably brought to the 
reprocessing facility in a spent fuel cask from the reactor spent fuel pool. The fuel is prepared by 
removing it from the transport cask, separating the fuel rods in each element, and chopping them 
up. The chopped segments can still be jacketed in their cladding with the exception of Magnox 
fuel, which must be mechanically separated first [18, p. 22]. The fuel is then dissolved in nitric 
acid and the uranium and plutonium are then separated through multiple solvent extraction 
cycles using tributyl phosphate (TBP). In this way, the plutonium is chemically separated from 
the uranium and other transuranics. 
                                                 
6 See Albright & Brannan for a detailed discussion hiding reactors through process heat-removal [33]. 
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 The annual throughput demand will be based on our assumed reactor situation. This will 
mean an annual throughput of approximately 100 tonnes per year. This is a comparable size to 
the North Korean reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, which also services Magnox fuel [34]. 
Because of the high level of attention that a reprocessing facility draws, it is also a safe 
assumption that there would be tremendous efforts to try to conceal this NFC process step. 
 
3.6.1 – Construction 
 Design and construction of a reprocessing facility is a major undertaking. While not 
terribly different from any other basic chemical processing plant, the radioactivity and criticality 
concerns must be taken into account in the design phase. The structure with all of its shielding 
requires substantial amounts of concrete. Designers and engineers have to take into account all of 
the necessary cell operations, exterior wall penetrations for operations systems, ventilation, and 
waste treatment. Quality assurance in the process equipment manufacturing and installation is 
very important; minimizing maintenance of the process equipment reduces operational time-
losses. The entire process requires large holding tanks (while still being small enough to avoid 
accidental criticality events), pulsed-air columns, ventilation, piping and valves, pumps, 
agitators, and steam jets [35, p. 537-538]7. The sheer size of a reprocessing plant can be 
appreciated by examining existing facilities. But the technology for such plants dates back to the 
early 1950’s. Construction and design will require effort by civil, mechanical, electrical, nuclear, 
and chemical engineers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Refer to Lemon & Reid for a more detailed discussion of individual process equipment demands. 
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3.6.2 – Operation 
 Reprocessing runs can continue in a fairly straightforward fashion during normal 
operating conditions. Many components in PUREX operate in a continuous stream. Chemists, 
chemical engineers and nuclear engineers will constitute the primary operations staff, with many 
technicians for operations maintenance. Remote controls in the hot cells will allow the process to 
continue smoothly, and while limiting exposure to workers. Collective experience operating any 
remotely complex chemical processing plant will translate effectively to running reprocessing 
operations. The separated plutonium product will likely be formed into metal ingots for transport 
to a weapons-pit manufacturing complex. 
 
3.7 – Other Demands & Processes 
 In addition to all of the other previously described processes, there are some additional 
demands on nuclear programs that should be factored into the calculations. A good example is 
that all nuclear processes will produce some amount of waste product that requires treatment and 
storage. This inescapable requirement is the same for almost every industrial-scale chemical 
process, but this will be representative as part of the construction and operation of each of the 
other identified steps. 
Plutonium production reactors can also be constructed to use heavy water as the 
moderator and coolant. But this means the state must either purchase heavy water from another 
state or produce its own. Because this report focuses on the indigenous efforts of the state, it is 
assumed that a state pursuing heavy water moderated reactor technology – similar to CANDU 
reactors – then the state will have to produce its own heavy water to reduce dependence on other 
states. But the two states that produced SNM for nuclear weapons from heavy water production 
 43 
 
reactors, India and Israel, acquired their initial supplies from abroad. Starting a NWP does not 
necessarily require heavy water production capabilities at the onset or in the initial stages of the 
program. 
 
3.7.1 – Heavy Water Production: Construction & Operation 
Heavy water production is a technology that dates back to the 1930’s, but still requires a 
fairly sizable industrial process. There are many different methods, but overwhelming majority 
of the world’s heavy water production is carried out through the hydrogen sulfide-water vapor 
exchange process [36, p. 841]. This process is based on the exchange between hydrogen sulfide 
and water: 
H20(l) + HDS(g) ↔ HDO(l) + H2S(g)        (3.3) 
The exchange process carries out between a cold and hot tower with temperatures around 32 and 
138°C, respectively [27, p. 767-768]. The hydrogen sulfide is recycled in the system, and the 
overall process can reach very high throughputs. Figure 3.13 shows an example of this process. 
 The overall process design, construction, and operation can be conducted as a fairly 
routine processing facility. As for most of the previous steps, mechanical, electrical and chemical 
engineers will be involved in the construction phase, but chemical process engineers and 
technicians will be the main requirements among educated specialists during operations. There is 
no unique radiation or criticality hazard that necessitates shielding or special controls and 
procedures. 
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Figure 3.13: Dual-Temperature reflux for water-hydrogen sulfide process [27] 
 
3.8 – Process Summary 
These industrial processes are completely necessary for the formation of nuclear 
weapons, but the type and number of nuclear facilities is dependent on the state’s needs and 
desires. Not every NFC process discussed above is necessary for a NWP, and so discussion in 
Chapter 5 will focus on the minimum process requirements needed for an initial uranium-based 
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or plutonium-based program. A state might also elect to have all NFC processes in order to have 
a fully-developed NFC; possibly to create the illusion of a peaceful, civilian dimension. This 
theory requires a decision-making analysis to determine a true proliferation pathway, but this is 
beyond the scope of this research. Despite this fact, the SNM-production technologies described 
here are necessary and relevant to assign appropriate values to the NFC process (P) development 
time. 
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Chapter 4: Weaponization Steps 
 Forming a functioning nuclear weapon, something that was not curtain to even be 
possible seventy years ago, is still a highly technical endeavor. The majority of the work spent 
accomplishing this is in the manufacture of the NEM used in nuclear weapons. But the ability to 
construct a rudimentary weapon is so trivial that graduate students at various DOE national 
laboratories are sometimes tested to see if they can design a functioning weapon [37]. A simple 
gun-type weapon design assembled with HEU, as was used against Hiroshima in 1945, is often 
discussed as the principle nuclear weapon design for sub-state groups. While a rudimentary gun-
type weapon is a viable, deliverable weapon, what is described in this section is meant to go 
beyond the discussion of the simplest case. A more modern implosion design – ideally made for 
future incorporation with a two-stage thermonuclear design – will be examined. All six of the 
technical steps discussed in Chapter 2 will be described here regardless of the SNM used in the 
weapon design. There is no viable nuclear weapon if a state cannot overcome these technical 
challenges. 
 
4.1 – Design 
 It may be the opinion of some that a basic nuclear weapon design is not very hard to 
come by. There are many plans and schematics that people can find on the internet, but like most 
information on the internet, there is a question of reliability. Many publicly available designs 
may lack in critical dimensions or may be missing important elements, but it takes a limited 
amount of engineering experience to determine what those shortcomings are. That being said, the 
level of detail expected for a modern weapon design is extraordinary, and there are still many 
design secrets and engineering secrets relating to specific dimensions, switches and electronics, 
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and other parts related to proper function. This is especially true when it becomes important to 
miniaturize weapons for delivery vehicles. 
It is also important to point out that a militarily useful weapon is one designed to function 
as intended, and not one with a highly unpredictable yield. The design must come first because it 
is the basis of all other testing, modeling and procurement efforts related to weaponization. 
Nuclear engineers and physicists with expertise in stochastic neutronics8, neutronics in a moving 
medium, and hydrodynamics are essential. A proper calculation of the stochastic neutronics 
requires some experimental data for neutron/fission calculations9. Technical support is also 
necessary from materials specialists, explosives specialists, and electrical engineers. More 
complex designs based on miniaturization, boosted fission or two-stage thermonuclear reactions 
are derived from achieving confidence in more basic designs. The requirements here include 
human capital, testing facilities, and having individuals with the highly specialized experience 
necessary for developing full design details. 
 
4.2 – Metallurgy 
 A dedicated facility, likely positioned within a military complex, must be constructed to 
assemble the HEU or plutonium pits. The NEM must be converted to a metal product (which 
may or may not be carried out at a separate conversion facility or as part of the reprocessing 
effort). Material properties of the NEM will require adjustment to the specified design. An 
example of this is to transition the allotropic phase of plutonium metal from the α-phase to the 
less dense δ-phase. The main engineering challenge from assembling the pits will be to do so 
without causing a criticality accident or radioactive exposure to the principle workers. 
                                                 
8 More detailed information on stochastic theories of neutron transport and stochastic point kinetics can be found 
through Ramsey, Axford and Hutchens [38].  
9 See Ramsey and Axford [39]. 
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Describing state experience on this topic is very difficult, and it is not known if there are any real 
distinctions between efforts undertaken by states that have produced nuclear weapons. This 
particular step will be gauged as minimal in its difficulty assessment. 
 
4.3 – Fuzing & Arming 
 Fuzing a weapon for detonation is not a trivial matter when you consider that is equally 
important, if not more so, to design a fuzing system that prevents the weapon from detonating 
before it is supposed to. This also helps to reinforce the point that timing is everything with 
nuclear weapons. It is for this reason that fuzing and arming are somewhat in tandem. Modern 
instruments and signal processing make it easier to design a simple fuzing system. Any military 
establishment will have a large pool of competent individuals with the skills necessary to 
construct a simple fuzing system. And as stated in Chapter 2, there will be minimal 
consideration for design aspects that go beyond making it functional and deliverable. It is 
reasonable to relate this aspect of weapons development with the design phase for consideration 
of quantifying time and capital invested in this step. 
 
4.4 – Initiation 
 Forcing a subcritical configuration of SNM to become prompt supercritical is the first 
main step in detonating a nuclear device, but while this increases the neutron multiplication 
factor, the initial number of fast neutrons in the system will ultimately determine the number of 
initial fissions that take place in the first generation. Hence, all mildly-sophisticated weapon 
designs need some form of neutron initiator to flood the supercritical assembly. 
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 The only rational for developing initiator technology is for production of a weapon. This 
specific weaponization element has emergence in recent news bulletins as additional evidence of 
a NWP in Iran: IAEA inspectors have requested access to a military site in Iran because of a 
suspected test on a neutron initiator conducted there [40]. This particular example likely 
illustrates the development of a chemical, internal neutron initiator (INI). The INI is located in 
the center of the implosion device, and it usually consists of two different elements which are 
kept separated until the weapon is detonated. An example of an INI is the combination of 
polonium and Li-7 or beryllium foil. When the two elements are combined, the alpha particles 
emitted from the polonium decay, principally from the Po-210 isotope, will interact with the 
lithium or beryllium to produce copious amounts of fast neutrons that will start fission reactions 
in the SNM [41, p. 187]. Another type of initiator is the external neutron initiator (ENI). The 
more complex ENI uses a miniature particle accelerator to produce (p, n) reactions in a target 
material. The resulting neutrons are released into the NEM to start fissions. 
 Initial efforts at producing an implosion device during the Manhattan Project hinged upon 
the construction of the initiator. As Richard Rhodes describes the initial efforts at implosion 
design, “Initiator design, significantly was one of the most difficult aspects of implosion 
development and effectively paced the plutonium implosion project” [41, p. 188] But with the 
level of open literature available on initiators and shaped charges, it is reasonable to assume that 
initiators are no longer the pace-setters for implosion-weapon construction and development. 
Creating initiators is not a major industrial undertaking, especially at a pace of one weapon per 
year. 
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4.5 – Heavy Metal Compression Testing 
 Isotropically imploding SNM is still a technically challenging endeavor, but it is far from 
being the most difficult step in weaponization. Sophisticated militaries and arms manufacturers 
have plenty of experience with creating shaped charges for conventional munitions – most 
notably in anti-tank weapons. But equal compression from simultaneously detonating the 
explosive charges around the SNM is a bit more complicated. Hydrodynamics is used to describe 
the compression of the pit, but it is also used to describe the next all-important step in weapons 
development, the compression of the fusion packet in a two-stage thermonuclear weapon. While 
this body of work focuses exclusively on efforts to create single-stage weapons, it is helpful to 
mention the added benefits of experience in hydrodynamics when considering the next step 
forward to two-stage thermonuclear weapons. If the hydrodynamics calculations are incorrect, 
the resulting outcome will likely be a nuclear explosion, but one of substantially degraded yield. 
 The compression testing is likely the most important step in verifying the validity of the 
initial design. Testing can be carried out on a depleted uranium surrogate or another appropriate 
heavy metal in place of the SNM. Figure 4.1 is the basic design drawn by Klaus Fuchs for the 
FBI 1950 [41]. The high explosive lenses surrounding the SNM are interweaving segments of 
“fast” and “slow” explosive lenses. This is one design that allows the energy of the high 
explosives to be focused inward on the pit. These variations of sub-critical testing are also strong 
external indicators of an active weaponization effort. 
 When considering all of the necessary weaponization steps, the only realistic way to 
judge the amount of time to go from the possession of SNM to a functioning, fairly sophisticated 
implosion weapon is to assess the education and industry metrics of the state. For weapon 
designs that are less sophisticated, thus requiring greater amounts of SNM for a comparable 
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yield, the burden on weaponization activities is reduced. This concept means that the operational 
demands for SNM production will be increased. An inverse relationship between the 
sophistication of the weapon design and the SNM demand is established. Because this body of 
research assumes that a definite annual SNM production rate provides approximately one 
weapon per year, the efforts to weaponize this material will also be fixed to a particular value. 
Assigning a set of reasonable weaponization values to the model will be described in detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagram of the Fat Man bomb with measurements deleted10 
                                                 
10 Photo credit: The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reproduced from Richard Rhodes [41] 
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Chapter 5: Data Accumulation & Assessment 
 A deeper understanding of how the de facto nuclear weapon states (see Table 2.4) 
achieved their capabilities is based on dissecting the steps that were taken to get there. But each 
state’s history nuclear weapons acquisition is complicated in some way by secrecy, uncertainty 
of present information, espionage efforts, international pressures, and developmental rate 
changes and freezes. These complications also restrict the accuracy and depth of information in 
open source literature regarding any given NWP. The information that was gathered on each 
state represents a large cross-section of open literature. It is compiled in this chapter to assign 
appropriate values to the amount of effort required to complete each process, while balancing the 
unique considerations faced by each of the discussed NWP’s. 
 The model requires an expression for the industrial robustness of the state, knowledge of 
NFC processes prior to engaging in weaponization work, the level of urgency given to 
completing the program, and the efforts to weaponize. But the first step is to identify the amount 
of time that each state required to go from political decision to full NWP. The timeframes for 
each de facto weapon state to complete at full NWP is listed in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Time to acquire nuclear weapons 
  DPRK India Israel Pakistan S. Africa 
Program Start 1982a 1964 1955 1972 1971 
Acquisitionb 2006 1974c 1967d 1990c 1978 
Time to Acquire (T) 24 10 12 18 7 
aCoded from Jo & Gartzke, bYear when full weapon capability is demonstrated through testing or otherwise 
assumed, cIndia's first test, designated as a PNE, dIsrael is believed to have rapidly assembled a weapon 
prior to the Six Days War, eDate assumed the first weapon was assembled. First test was not until 1998. 
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5.1 – Pursuit Rate 
 Comparing the efforts between de facto weapon states will start with an understanding of 
the pursuit rates that each nation undertook. The circumstances that drove each of these five 
states to develop nuclear weapons are entirely unique, but there is one element that is common 
throughout: all of these states received some form of outside assistance. The level of assistance 
from foreign sources varies between states and varies in time. This introduces an incredible set of 
complexities that cannot be taken into account in this document. However, it is reasonably 
possible to express the level of urgency that each state gave its nuclear program at any given 
point in development. These rates, which were first discussed in Table 2.3, are assigned values in 
Table 5.2 to help determine the overall programmatic pursuit rate of each state in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2: Development rate coefficient values 
Rate Type Category Coefficient Value 
Crash 1 0.5 
Aggressive 2 0.8 
Cautious 3 1 
Exploratory 4 1.5 
 
 Some comments can be made regarding the final values of each assigned rate in Table 
5.3. A category 2 value is given to India and South Africa – both states pursued an aggressive 
path because of geopolitical considerations and neither of these states experienced much 
resistance in the form of international pressure. A similar case is developed for Israel with the 
exception of a hurried effort to develop a functioning weapon at the onset of the Six-Days War 
1967. Pakistan’s urgency to develop nuclear weapons became significantly enhanced after 
India’s “peaceful nuclear explosive” test and this can be seen in the final rate value that it was 
assigned. The North Korean NWP is substantially more complicated than the others. After 
starting off with Soviet assistance in the early 1980’s, the program became the focus of Western 
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suspicion later in the decade. This focus led to a crisis in 1994 that was temporarily contained 
with the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States. The plutonium-based 
weapons program was on a virtual freeze until the Agreed Framework was abandoned in 2003, 
after which the DPRK worked feverishly to complete the project. 
Table 5.3: Rate of pursuit coefficient assessments 
  Pursuit Rate Category Explanation 
DPRK 
1982-1994 Cautious 3 Steady development 
1994-2003 Exploratory 4 Near freeze after Agreed Framework 
2003-2006 Crash 1 NPT withdrawal; rush to weaponize 
Assigned Coefficient 1.13 
India 
1964-1974 Aggressive 2 Steady development until first test 
Assigned Coefficient 0.80 
Israel 
1955-1956 Cautious 3 Development sought 
1957-1966 Aggressive 2 Suez Crisis leads to increased intent 
1967 Crash 1 Outbreak of Six-Days War 
Assigned Coefficient 0.81 
Pakistan 
1972-1974 Cautious 3 Initial development 
1974-1990 Aggressive 2 Increased urgency after India test 
Assigned Coefficient 0.82 
S. Africa 
1971-1978 Aggressive 2 Steady development 
Assigned Coefficient 0.80   
 
A case can be made that each of these NWP’s had some variation of an “exploratory 
phase” prior to any political decision to pursue a full-scope NWP. But this judgment will 
complicate the assessment because then it can be said that if all programs had an exploratory 
phase, it could date back to the time of the first nuclear weapons use at the end of WWII, and this 
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is not particularly insightful. Additionally, the level of each state’s experience at the onset of the 
NWP can be characterized by the experience level of the technical community at the time the 
political decision is made. 
 
5.2 – Industry Metrics 
 The strength of industry that can be brought to bear on a NWP is the strongest 
determining factor beyond the core competency that is necessary to construct and operate a 
nuclear weapons complex. But determining the strength of industry is not terribly 
straightforward. When Meyer first proposed industrial metrics for determining the “latent” 
proliferation capability of a state, it was done by asking whether or not the state had a minimum 
capability in that given category11. The difficulty with this approach, as expressed earlier, is that 
it does not help us determine the potential added benefit of having industry beyond a set 
threshold. While more detailed studies of these possible correlations are necessary, a basic 
examination of historical data can shed some light for this research to proceed. Table 5.4 is a 
listing of some industrial factors compiled through several different editions of the United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook. A normalized comparison of the per capita rate of the date in Table 
5.4 is offered in Figure 5.1, along with the per capita vocational education rates (presented in 
table-form in the next section). The data for each state is given for the time closest to the start of 
their respective NWP. 
 The individual industrial metrics were chosen for their importance in NFC process 
construction and operation, and also because these values were identified by Meyer as being key 
metrics [3, p. 186]. From this information we can see that a state like South Africa has a much 
greater advantage over the other states in consideration. Israel also has fairly decent industrial 
                                                 
11 See “Appendix B: The Technical Model,” [3, pp. 173-193] 
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numbers, but these are highly limited by their comparatively small population in 1955. 
Conversely, India’s industrial numbers appear very large until the population size is taken into 
account. But the per capita comparison may not be as important for India because a “sufficiently 
large” industry is what is being gauged. 
 
Table 5.4: Comparative industrial metrics at the onset of the respective state’s NWP 
DPRKc India Israel Pakistan S. Africa 
Year of Program Start 1982 1964 1955 1972 1971 
Population (million people) 15.9 472 1.77 65.3 23.1 
Installed Electric Capacity (MW) 7,500 (1983) 8,397 (1966) 239 1,820 13,435 
Nitric Acid Production (1,000 t)a 12 1.6 (1960)b 
Cement Production (1,000 t) 8,000 9,690 664 2,605 7,296 
Crude Steel Production (1,000 t) 3,500 6,032  24 (1959)b   5,832 
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook Year 1983/84 1966 1958 1975 1975 
Parenthesis denote the year of closest available data, aIn terms of 100% nitric acid, bvalues for DPRK are entirely 
estimated, c1966 yearbook. 
 
What is not reflected in this study – for several reasons – is the change in industry over 
the course of the program. This is especially important for the DPRK. At the start of the 
program, the DPRK enjoyed tremendous economic benefits as a client state of the USSR. It 
should also be noted that the numbers for the DPRK are listed as estimates in the Statistical 
Yearbook. Rendering a final judgment on the industry coefficient (I) for each state will be 
deferred until after the scientific and process-step values are determined. 
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Figure 5.1: Per capita industry metric comparisons12 
                                                 
12 Information on steel production in Pakistan and vocational education is DPRK and South Africa was not 
available. 
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5.3 – Knowledge Metrics 
 In much the same way that industry plays a part in developing a NWP, education metrics 
can be used to help assign values to knowledge coefficients. Human capital is as important as 
having a requisite level of industrial strength, if not more. Modern technological connectivity has 
become an enhancing factor regarding access to basic scientific resources and knowledge; a fact 
that will allow a state to better train, educate, and recruit knowledgeable individuals. But there is 
no substitute for direct scientific and engineering experience. The strength of the education base 
does not just apply to the strength of upper educational institutions. It is also important to have a 
knowledgeable base of educated professionals to carry out the more regular tasks in a NWP. 
Access has to be given to a sufficiently large labor market in a given state for competent 
tradesmen such as electricians, plumbers, construction workers, and office works. For this 
reason, Table 5.5 and Figure 5.2 also list the numbers of individuals in the education system and 
the normalized per capita comparison, respectively. 
Table 5.5: Comparative educational metrics at NWP onset 
  DPRK India Israel Pakistan S. Africa 
Year of Program Start 1982 1964 1955 1972 1971 
Population (million people) 15.9 472 1.77 65.3 23.1 
Vocational Institutions (1963) (1973) 
Instructors -- 21,396 999 1,810 -- 
Enrolled -- 340,000 11,922 25,798 -- 
Higher Education Institutions (1972) (1973) 
Instructors -- 80,247 -- 3,790 -- 
Enrolled -- 1,310,000 7,500 107,757 98,577a 
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook Year 1983/84 1966 1958 1975 1975 
Data in parenthesis denote the year of closest available data, afrom 1976 Statistical Yearbook [46] 
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Figure 5.2: Per capita education metrics13 
                                                 
13 Information on vocational education in South Africa and education information on the DPRK was unavailable. 
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 Regrettably, the lack of education-based numbers from some states is glaring and 
unfortunate, but it is interesting to note the strength of the Israeli and South African upper 
education systems, as well as the vocational system in Israel. It is on the latter point that a 
competitive edge can be given to Israel. India also shows an education base that, when multiplied 
out to its population size, demonstrates a significant human capital pool. 
 Prior experience in nuclear fuel cycle operations is another principle education factor. A 
state with a commercial or research reactor will have more collective knowledge on constructing 
and operating a future project. The same is true for any of the fuel cycle operations. Cataloging 
this knowledge, as displayed below in Table 5.6, is important to show which steps can be given 
the benefit of additional operating knowledge. Only the highlighted fields represent known or 
suspected operations that predate weapons programs. With data on pursuit rates, industry and 
education, it is now possible to start assigning values to each countries process steps. 
Table 5.6: Process experience prior to NWP initiation 
  DPRKc India Israel Pakistan S. Africa 
Mining/Milling -- -- -- -- -- 
Conversion 1968c Early 1980'sd 
Enrichment -- 1985c -- 1981e Early 1960'sf 
Fuel Fab. 1971 1975c -- 
Irradiation 1965a 1956a 1960a 1965a 1965a 
PUREX 1975b 1964 -- -- 
Heavy Water -- 1962c   -- -- 
Hightlighted times indicate known experience prior to achieving a NWP threshold. Sources: aIAEA "Nuclear 
Research Reactors in the world" [47], bAlbright et al [17], cCirincione et al [48], dRisk Report [49], eCNS 
"Pakistan's Nuclear Related Facilities" [50], fAlbright [51]. 
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5.4 – Establishing the Values 
 The final step in determining the timetables of future at-risk proliferation states is to 
determine the value of each step in achieving the whole. Reverse engineering these programs and 
fitting the knowledge of each one will yield an analytical method for determining future 
timetables of full weapons-program acquisition. Based on the discussion of each step in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4, values for the construction and operation of the NFC and weaponization 
processes can be expressed; these values are set in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, respectively. These 
numbers increase with the perceived level of required effort, and designate a comparable 
standard. Because these values represent the standard set, it should not change from one state 
program to the next with the exception of steps that were already completed or partially 
completed prior to the weapon program decision being made. 
Table 5.7: Standard process variable values 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 
Conversion 3 3 
Enrichment 5 10 
Fuel Fab. 2 2 
Irradiation 5 5 
PUREX 4 3 
Heavy Water 2 2 
 
Table 5.8: Standard weaponization effort values 
  Weaponization (W) 
Design 3 
Metallurgy 1 
Fuzing 1 
Initiation 1 
Compression 1.5 
 
Table 5.9 is the combined listing of each state’s NWP-level construction and operation 
steps. This information is also presented graphically in Figure 5.3 (plutonium-based NWP’s) and 
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Figure 5.4 (uranium-based NWP’s). The procedure for assigning values will also rely on making 
some determinations and special considerations for each state. These considerations are based 
upon the unique circumstances of each program. Each state will be evaluated individually. 
Table 5.9: Time NFC process construction and operation reached NWP levels 
  DPRK India Israel Pakistan S. Africa 
Program Start 1982 1964 1955 1972 1971 
Acquisition 2006 1974 1967 1990 1978 
Threshold-level process construction start/end dates 
Mining/Milling 1960'sa -1967c     -1955h 
Conversion -1984a 1957-k -1980 
Enrichment -- -- -- 1976-1981g 1969-1974i 
Fuel Fab. -1974a -1970c 1957-k -- -- 
Irradiation 1980-1986b 1955-1960d -1963d -- -- 
PUREX 1985-1989?a 1961-1964c 1957-k -- -- 
Heavy Water -- -1962e   -- -- 
Threshold-level process operation started 
Mining/Milling Early 1960'sa 1967c   1977-1978e 1955h 
Conversion 1984a 1972f 1980c 
Enrichment -- -- -- 1981g 1974j 
Fuel Fab. 1974a 1971c -- -- 
Irradiation 1986b 1960c 1963d -- -- 
PUREX 1989b 1964c Before 1967 -- -- 
Heavy Water -- 1962e   -- -- 
aFAS North Korean Special Weapons Facilities [52], bAlbright et al [17], cNTI Country Profiles [7], 
dIAEA "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World" [47], eBenedict, Pigford, Levi [27, p. 711], fNFCIS-
IAEA [4], gPakistan's Nuclear Related Facilities [50], hFord [53, p 37], iAlbright [51], jCirincione et al 
[48], kDate estimated based on signing of Dimona agreement with France on 10/03/1957 [54]. 
 
 
5.4.1 – DPRK 
 As described earlier in this chapter, the DPRK went through several changes in its pursuit 
rate because of its unique geopolitical interactions with the United States in the early 1990’s and 
2000’s. In addition to these changes, the collapse of the Soviet Union – the primary economic 
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and military backer of the DPRK – coincided with a major downshift in the industrial and 
educational prowess of that state. These factors can be observed very prominently in Figure 5.3, 
where a significant stretch of time takes hold between the establishment of PUREX operations 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the first weapon test in 2006. The change in 
rate is already numerically factored into the equation, but the decline in industrial capabilities is 
difficult to gauge. It is also difficult to gauge the education metrics – as no numerical data was 
available. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Program Start
Mining/Milling
Conversion
Fuel Fab.
Irradiation
PUREX
Heavy Water
Full Weapon
 DPRK Start/End
 DPRK Construction
 DPRK Operation
 India Start/End
 India Construction
 India Operation
 Israel Start/End
 Israel Construction
 Israel Operation
Years
 
Figure 5.3: Plutonium program time-steps 
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1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992
Program Start
Mining/Milling
Conversion
Enrichment
Full Weapon
 Pakistan Start/Finish
 Pakistan Construction
 Pakistan Operation
 S. Africa Start/Finish
 S. Africa Construction
 S. Africa Operation
Year
 
Figure 5.4: HEU program time-steps 
 Despite these issues, the DPRK has a significant nuclear training complex, and many 
engineers and technicians were sent to Soviet institutions for education throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century. Also, the absolute control that the government exercises over the 
economy gives the DPRK the latitude to focus a disproportionately higher level of resources 
towards a nuclear project as compared to other states. Table 5.10 is the full variable calibration 
performed on the DPRK with values assigned to every applicable field. Construction on the 
mining/milling and fuel fabrication steps was reduced to zero because those elements of the fuel 
cycle were in place prior the decision to pursue a weapon. The DPRK reactors also do not use 
heavy water, and some measure of confidence can be given to their knowledge of fuel cycle 
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operations. The most difficult area to correctly assign values is the weaponization knowledge, 
hence these values were given a conservative, equal weighting. Rough breakdowns of the effort 
undertaken by the state are also shown. Discussion of the calculated results, the validity of the 
values assigned to each element in the table, and what it means going forward will be discussed 
at the end of this chapter. 
Table 5.10: DPRK – values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 0 3 1.2 
Conversion 3 3 1.2 
Enrichment -- -- -- 
Fuel Fab. 0 2 1.1 
Irradiation 5 5 1.3 
PUREX 4 3 1.3 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
Effort 12 16 78.87% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 3.0 1.0 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.0 
Fuzing 1.0 1.0 
Initiation 1.0 1.0 
Compression 1.5 1.0 
Effort 7.5   21.13% 
Industry (I) 1.40 
Rate (R) 1.13 Actual Completion 24 Years 
Calculated Time (T) 24.1 
 
 
5.4.2 – India 
 India received a head-start in its nuclear program through collaborative efforts on nuclear 
technology through the United States and Canada. These efforts gave India several facilities and 
many years of experience that were used in its initial program to construct and detonate a PNE in 
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1974. It is for this reason that several fuel cycle construction values are zeroed out in the value 
breakdown given for India in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11: India – values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 1.2 
Conversion 3 3 1.1 
Enrichment -- -- -- 
Fuel Fab. 2 2 1.1 
Irradiation 0 5 1.3 
PUREX 0 3 1.3 
Heavy Water 0 2 1.2 
Total Effort 10 18 78.87% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 3 1.2 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.1 
Fuzing 1.0 1.0 
Initiation 1.0 1.0 
Compression 1.5 1.0 
Total Effort 7.5   21.13% 
Industry (I) 2.25 
Rate (R) 0.80 Actual Completion 10 
Calculated Time (T) 10.8 
 
India’s industrial value is elevated because of the size of the advantages granted to it by its large 
population; per capita values are low, but the raw production values are competitive. Education 
is slightly elevated for the same reason, and because of its previous fuel cycle experience. The 
calculated time for an Indian program is slightly greater than the actual completion time, despite 
the belief that the assigned programmatic values are reasonable. It is possible that this is reflected 
in the fact that India’s first nuclear detonation was a PNE, principally not a deliverable weapon 
for military use. This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it is an important to note that some 
significant time was spent to further advance the Indian program to field a deliverable weapon. It 
could be very interesting if this fact is playing out in some way with the final calculated time. 
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5.4.3 – Israel 
 The level of secrecy surrounding the Israeli weapons program makes analysis very 
difficult. Based on what is generally understood, the Israeli program was mainly an indigenous 
effort, but the scientific and technical communities are advanced. This is not just based on high 
enrollment numbers in upper education, but the contributions from vocational and trade schools 
are very important for a state with a comparatively small population. Coupled with a strong 
industrial base and an accelerated program rate, it is believed that the Israel program came to 
fruition 1967 after twelve years. When compared to the Indian program, the Israeli numbers in 
Table 5.12 show that increased education and industry factors have compensated for the lack of 
initial fuel cycle infrastructure. 
Table 5.12: Israel – values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 1.2 
Conversion 3 3 1.3 
Enrichment -- -- -- 
Fuel Fab. 2 2 1.2 
Irradiation 5 5 1.3 
PUREX 4 3 1.2 
Heavy Water 2 2 1.2 
Total Effort 21 18 83.87% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 3.0 1.2 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.1 
Fuzing 1.0 1.1 
Initiation 1.0 1.1 
Compression 1.5 1.1 
Total Effort 7.5   16.13% 
Industry (I) 2.50 
Rate (R) 0.81 Actual Completion 12 
Calculated Time (T) 12.3 
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5.4.4 – Pakistan 
 The Pakistani program – which was accelerated in the wake of the Indian nuclear test in 
1974 and benefited substantially from illicit nuclear technology transfers – is an example of how 
a state of fairly low technical capability can achieve a viable program. Reflected in Pakistan’s 
numbers – in Table 5.13 – is the enhanced knowledge on enrichment through gaseous centrifuge 
technology. A.Q. Khan provided Pakistan with centrifuge blueprints and a list of parts suppliers. 
Pakistan also received assistance in their nuclear program in the form of a detailed weapon 
design provided by China [55, p. 3]. 
Table 5.13: Pakistan – values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 1.1 
Conversion 3 3 1.0 
Enrichment 5 10 1.4 
Fuel Fab. -- -- -- 
Irradiation -- -- -- 
PUREX -- -- -- 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
Total Effort 13 16 86.57% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 0 1.0 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.0 
Fuzing 1.0 1.1 
Initiation 1.0 1.1 
Compression 1.5 1.0 
Total Effort 4.5   13.43% 
Industry (I) 1.25 
Rate (R) 0.82 Years to complete 18 
Calculated Time (T) 18.6 
 
When assigning values it was determined that the assistance from the Chinese could also 
increase the knowledge coefficients in other weaponization activities, such as initiation and 
fuzing. Industry and education are significantly reduced compared to other states. Assistance in 
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key areas helped the Pakistani program become what it is, although the clandestine tech imports 
and procurement efforts cannot be expressed directly. 
 
5.4.5 – South Africa 
 At the time their nuclear program was started, South Africa already had a fully developed 
mining industry. South Africa has vast uranium ore deposits and uranium mining efforts in this 
country date back to the Manhattan Project [53, p. 38]. It can be assumed from this information 
that when South Africa’s government sought nuclear weapons in 1971, there was considerable 
knowledge in extracting, processing, and handling uranium.  
Table 5.14: South Africa – values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 0 3 1.2 
Conversion 3 3 1.2 
Enrichment 3 10 1.3 
Fuel Fab. -- -- -- 
Irradiation -- -- -- 
PUREX -- -- -- 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
Total Effort 6 16 74.58% 
Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw) 
Design 3.0 1.1 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.1 
Fuzing 1.0 1.1 
Initiation 1.0 1.1 
Compression 1.5 1.1 
Total Effort 7.5   25.42% 
Industry (I) 2.75 
Rate (R) 0.80 Years to complete 7 
Calculated Time (T) 7.07 
 
South Africa is coded as having the strongest industry compared to the other four states 
discussed in this chapter. Despite the lack of numbers available for South Africa’s vocational 
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school enrollment, it is reasonable to assume that these numbers are elevated based on the strong 
industrial numbers, and upper education metrics. 
 
5.5 – Assessments 
The purpose of assigning the values in this way is to generate a comfortable range of 
values that can be translated to future test cases and evaluations. Each of these states described 
above has unique characteristics and circumstances that were appropriately programmed into 
their respective data tables. This is a great benefit of this method; assumptions about a program 
based on high-confidence information can be expressed appropriately by this model. 
It is also necessary to state that some of the values assigned in this portion are based on 
conjecture, but they are assigned values with a significant level of qualitative justification. This 
is not an unreasonable method of assessment for such a complex system where large portions of 
usable numerical data are either unknown or unavailable to the public. In going forward with the 
test cases in the next chapter, there is a sufficient scope of appropriate numerical values to make 
reasonable judgments. But because the level of potential error that is intrinsic to this form of 
methodology, a detailed sensitivity analysis is carried out on a test case and can be found in 
Appendix-A. 
  
 71 
 
Chapter 6: Model Testing & Analysis 
 Using the accumulated information from all of the previous chapters, we are now able to 
test the validity, accuracy, and utility of the model equations. The three states that are being 
examined – Myanmar, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Turkey – were chosen because they 
are interesting from a geopolitical standpoint and they all have very different levels of experience 
with nuclear technology. Myanmar, which has recently been in the spotlight for a possible illicit 
trade relationship with the DPRK, has no nuclear facilities, and a comparatively weak industry 
and educational base. Turkey has some experience with nuclear facilities but this is not a very 
large program. The ROK is a very interesting case because it is very experienced with nuclear 
technology, has very strong industry and education, and is in a geopolitical hot-zone in the Far 
East. In testing these cases, it is necessary to provide similar information on industrial 
production, education, and previous NFC experience. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are the industrial and 
education metrics, respectively. The ROK is very dominant in all categories, despite Turkey 
having a population advantage. 
Table 6.1: 2006 Industry metrics for test states 
  Myanmar ROK Turkey 
Population (million people) 48.7 47.8 72.1 
Electricity Production (1,000 TOE) 286 13,262 3,823 
Calculated Equivalent (MW) 380 17,607 5,076 
Cement Production (1,000 t) 552 55,021 47,906 
Crude Steel Production (1,000 t) 25 48,259 23,308 
Data from the 2009 U.N. Statistical Yearbook [56]. Electricity production converted from TOE to MW 
Because of changes made to the United Nations Statistical Yearbooks, current 
information is not necessarily presented in the same way as in older editions. This creates a 
problem for comparison purposes between the data provided for the de facto weapon states and 
the data presented here. The education metrics are categorized differently, with “vocational 
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education” and “installed electrical capacity” being eliminated as outright categories. The 
installed capacity is replaced with “electrical production” – which is not equivalent, but still 
provides useful data – and education is expressed as “secondary” and “tertiary” levels to cover 
all of the pertinent areas of education. Newer editions of the Statistical Yearbook also include 
information on research and development activities. Because of these changes, a strong 
comparison to the numerical data supplied for the de facto weapon states were not attempted. 
Table 6.2: 2007 Education metrics for test states 
  Myanmar ROK Turkey 
Population (million people) 48.7 47.8 72.1 
Secondary Education - Enrolled 2,686,198 3,917,400 5,527,208 
Tertiary Education - Enrolled 507,660 3,208,591 2,453,664 
Research & Development 
Researchers 837 (2002) 289,098 49,668 
Technicians 6,499 (2002) 94,319 7,420 
Data from the 2009 U.N. Statistical Yearbook [56]. Parenthesis indicate year of closest available data. 
 
 When industry and education information was examined for the de facto weapon states, it 
was based on the information that was closest to the starting time of the NWP for that particular 
state. This current information, ranging from 2002-2007, is expected to be substantially elevated 
compared to state values that are thirty or more years old. When factored against population as 
part of the per capita comparison and total production values – see Figures 6.1 and 6.2 – this 
trend is very clear. It is expected that the modern, industrialized state is more capable of 
completing NWP on a faster timetable. Access to better computing power and the internet also 
decreases the negative impact of diminished educational values. Nuclear fuel cycle experience 
data in Table 6.3 is the last piece of information needed to make a series of reasonable 
assessments in how long it is likely to take a state to produce a full NWP. Myanmar has no 
nuclear experience, while Turkey and the ROK have proficiency in this area. 
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Figure 6.1: Annual cement production comparisons (per capita and total) 
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Figure 6.2: Annual steel production comparisons (per capita and total) 
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Table 6.3: Nuclear process information for test cases 
  Myanmar ROK Turkey 
  Time of Initial Operating Experience 
Mining/Milling -- -- 1974ab 
Conversion -- 1989ab 1986b 
Enrichment -- -- -- 
Fuel Fab. -- 1987b 1986b 
Irradiation -- 1962c 1962c 
PUREX -- -- -- 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
  Present Effort/Experience 
Mining/Milling None No Domestic Production Ore Processing: shutdownb 
Conversion None Pilot-Decommissionedd Pilot plantb 
Enrichment None Experimentede None 
Fuel Fab. None 800 t U/a capacityd Pilot plantb 
Irradiation None 15,700 MW(e) installedd Two research reactorse 
PUREX None Experimentede Limited experiencee 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
aListed facility is being decommissioned. A new one will require construction, bIAEA NFCIS [4], cIAEA 
"Nuclear Research Reactors in the world" [47], dTRS-425-IAEA [15], eNTI Country Profiles [7]. 
 
6.1 – Myanmar 
 For each of the three test-cases, the values will be programed two show both uranium and 
plutonium-based weapons as two different tracks. Each state will also be tested through the four 
different pursuit rates. For Myanmar, the lack of experience in nuclear energy and the weak 
industry makes this a very difficult challenge. Without any help from other states, Myanmar 
could be expected to take on the order of decades to achieve a weapon capability, even under 
crash-rate conditions. While independent confirmation of this estimate is unlikely to be available, 
the values expressed in Table 6.4 are not unreasonable. Error values in the measurements are not 
assessed here, but the sensitivity analysis in Appendix A can help address possible uncertainty 
issues. 
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Table 6.4: Myanmar - values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 1 
Conversion 3 3 1 
Enrichment 5 10 1 
Fuel Fab. 2 2 1 
Irradiation 5 5 1 
PUREX 4 3 1 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
Effort 24 26 86.96% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 3.0 1.0 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.0 
Fuzing 1.0 1.0 
Initiation 1.0 1.0 
Compression 1.5 1.0 
Effort 7.5   13.04% 
Industry (I) 1.20     
Uranium-Weapon Plutonium Weapon 
Rate   Time (T) Time (T) 
Crash 0.5 15.2 17.7 
Aggressive 0.8 24.3 28.3 
Cautious 1.0 30.4 35.4 
Exploratory 1.5 45.6 53.1 
 
6.2 – Republic of Korea 
 Excellent knowledge from considerable levels of operating experience helps the ROK 
nuclear program considerably. It is reasonable to assess that a plutonium-based weapon can be 
fielded in five years with its current capabilities, if it elects to pursue weapons regardless of the 
consequences. There are however several issues with the ROK assessment, in Table 6.5, that 
must be pointed out. South Korea does not have domestic uranium deposits of any kind. The 
assumption that can be substituted in place of mining considerations is an effort at either slow 
accumulation or diversion of uranium yellowcake or UF6. And despite the fact that the ROK has 
a large number of reactors, it is assumed that the state will likely opt to independently produce 
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some form of production reactor – likely to attempt to circumvent IAEA safeguards or to prevent 
its civilian power reactors from becoming legitimate military targets. 
Table 6.5: ROK - values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 1 
Conversion 3 3 1.3 
Enrichment 5 10 1.1 
Fuel Fab. 2 2 1.4 
Irradiation 5 5 1.5 
PUREX 4 3 1.1 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
Total Effort 24 26 86.96% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 3 1.2 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.2 
Fuzing 1.0 1.1 
Initiation 1.0 1.1 
Compression 1.5 1.2 
Total Effort 7.5   13.04% 
Industry (I) 3.5     
Uranium-Weapon Plutonium Weapon 
Rate   Time (T) Time (T) 
Crash 0.5 4.66 4.99 
Aggressive 0.8 7.46 7.98 
Cautious 1.0 9.33 9.97 
Exploratory 1.5 13.99 15.0 
 
6.3 – Turkey 
 The thought of a Turkish NWP is likely to stem from an arms race scenario developing in 
the Middle East, should Iran acquire a nuclear capability. However likely or remote this 
possibility is, it is worth studying the possible creation of a NWP in a state with good industry 
and some level of nuclear experience. As Table 6.6 indicates, Turkey’s efforts are likely to take a 
decade or longer to produce a program based on the information previously described. Again this 
assumption is reasonable, but all of these values have to be accepted with an understanding that – 
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as explained in the previous chapter – the values assigned to each variable are based on 
qualitative findings. For Turkey, Myanmar and the ROK, the values expressed are meant to serve 
as a guide, and not necessarily as a prediction. 
Table 6.6: Turkey - values and timetable calibration 
  Construction (C) Operation (O) Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 3 1.1 
Conversion 3 3 1.1 
Enrichment 5 10 1 
Fuel Fab. 2 2 1.1 
Irradiation 5 5 1.1 
PUREX 4 3 1 
Heavy Water -- -- -- 
Total Effort 24 26 86.96% 
  Weaponization (W) Knowledge (Sw)   
Design 3.0 1 
Metallurgy 1.0 1 
Fuzing 1.0 1 
Initiation 1.0 1 
Compression 1.5 1 
Total Effort 7.5   13.04% 
Industry (I) 2.80     
Uranium-Weapon Plutonium Weapon 
Rate   Time (T) Time (T) 
Crash 0.5 6.29 7.1 
Aggressive 0.8 10.06 11.4 
Cautious 1.0 12.58 14.3 
Exploratory 1.5 18.87 21.4 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions & Future Work 
The research presented in this work is meant to support nuclear nonproliferation efforts 
by demonstrating that timeframes for developing a nuclear weapon program, in any given state, 
can be effectively estimated based on quantitative metrics and qualitative analysis. This method 
of modeling helps prospective users focus attention on specific NFC processes, technical steps 
that allow a state to go from the creation of SNM to the development of a deployable nuclear 
weapon, and how the unique circumstances of a state can impact its ability to complete a 
program. There are some clear disadvantages to this particular method. It is limited in its ability 
to correctly explain the order of progression through the various NWP-creation steps; some 
creation steps must commence in a particular series and some can be worked out in parallel. The 
industry can compensate for this by showing that a state with a sufficiently sized industry can 
engage in multiple areas at once – and hence is operating in parallel by some measure. But this is 
not a satisfactory way of handling this problem. 
 Another disadvantage of this model is that assigning appropriate values to each variable 
is not based on a straightforward process. That in itself seems to suggest that there is an 
“unscientific” methodology with this approach, but like all matters that involve intelligence 
assessment, there is some intrinsic level of uncertainty. The model is meant to be a framework 
through which known facts and assumptions made by the user can be combined to answer 
meaningful nonproliferation questions: 
1. If the political decision is made to ready a NWP, approximately how long will it take? 
2. Based on information from two different points in time, is a state proliferating? 
3. What sequence of values in the model – and by extension, what level of real world values 
– does a state need to achieve in order to have a “latent” capability? 
 
There is not a completely straightforward approach to modeling a system as complex as nuclear 
weapons development, but this work is an important support step for those analytical efforts. 
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 Future work in this area is likely to consist primarily of two parts: 1) efforts to improve 
accuracy and functionality and 2) efforts to incorporate political and economic dimensions. 
Improving the effectiveness can be done partially by introducing a more scientific or 
statistically-motivated method of determining input values. Addressing the specifics of how well 
a state may be able to produce – or acquire by various other means – the parts that it needs may 
lead to better estimations of the total process step. Political and economic factors can include 
assumptions on the effects of market conditions or the level of democratization in a state.  
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Appendix A – Sensitivity Analysis 
 A straightforward sensitivity analysis is performed in this section to demonstrate the 
system response to changes in an equation constant. The purpose of this exercise is to 
demonstrate the effect on the equation outcome from a change in the value of each variable. Data 
taken from programmatic information on the Israeli nuclear program was used for this purpose. 
Table A.1 is a reproduction of those values originally used in Table 5.12 with changes of ten 
percent (δ = 0.1). The change in variable response is shown in Table A.2. 
Table A.1: 10% Change in values of Israeli program test numbers 
  Construction (C) C+δC Operation (O) O+δO Knowledge (Sp) 
Mining/Milling 5 5.5 3 3.3 1.2 
Conversion 3 3.3 3 3.3 1.3 
Fuel Fab. 2 2.2 2 2.2 1.2 
Irradiation 5 5.5 5 5.5 1.3 
PUREX 4 4.4 3 3.3 1.2 
Heavy Water 2 2.2 2 2.2 1.2 
          Sp +δSp 
  Weaponization (W) W+δW Knowledge (Sw) Sw +δSw 1.32 
Design 3.0 3.3 1.2 1.32 1.43 
Metallurgy 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.21 1.32 
Fuzing 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.21 1.43 
Initiation 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.21 1.32 
Compression 1.5 1.65 1.1 1.21 1.32 
Industry (I) 2.50 I+δI 2.75 
Rate (R) 0.81 R+δR 0.89     
 
Table A.2: Changes in time T for given value adjustments 
  Calculated Time (T) Change in T Percent Change 
Original 12.33 -- -- 
C+δC 12.88 0.55 4.46% 
O+δO 12.80 0.47 3.81% 
Sp +δSp 11.41 -0.93 -7.52% 
W+δW 12.55 0.21 1.73% 
Sw +δSw 12.14 -0.19 -1.57% 
I+δI 11.21 -1.12 -9.09% 
R+δR 13.57 1.23 10.00% 
 
 86 
 
The construction (C) and operation (O) constants are set fairly rigorously and there is a 
low level of change from adjusting this value. The same is true for the weaponization (W) 
constants. However, the effects from the process knowledge (Sp), industry (I) and rate (R) values 
are much more pronounced. This is not terribly unreasonable or unexpected, as these three 
elements are the primary determinations for the rate that a program can be assembled. This 
analysis does place some additional level of emphasis on the need to better streamline the 
process for assigning these coefficients. 
Because the rate values are the most sensitive, an effort was made to reexamine the 
pursuit rates of the de facto states. This reevaluation is shown in Table A.3, where a slight 
change in the rate values is made to demonstrate the change between the calculated and 
programmed completion times. Because the programmed completion time values are rounded to 
the nearest year, the accuracy of the newly recalculated rate values is questionable, but the 
methodology points to a way of reevaluating all of the data in this study in the future. 
Table A.3: Rate value reevaluation 
Assigned Time to Completion Recalculated 
  Rate Programmed Calculated Rate 
DPRK 1.13 24 24.1 1.13 
India 0.80 10 10.8 0.74 
Israel 0.81 12 12.3 0.79 
Pakistan 0.82 18 18.6 0.79 
S. Africa 0.80 7 7.07 0.79 
 
